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Memorandum Presenting a Proposal for Bringing the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines into Conformity with
Blakely v. Washington
Editor's Note: Professor Frank Bowman submitted
the following memorandum to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission on June 27, 2004, three days after Blakely
was decided, which analyzes the likely effects of Blakely
and proposes a legislative response to the opinion.
Professor Bowman suggested that the Guidelines could
be made Blakely-compliant by raising the top of exising
guideline ranges to the statutory maximum for the
offense or offense of conviction. Professor Bowman
discussed his proposal in June 6, 2004 testimony before
the House Judiciary Committee and in July 13, 2004
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee. The
proposal has been the subject of considerable debate
and some pointed criticism. See, e.g., Senate Hearing
Testimony of Rachel Barkow (July 13, 2004), available at
http://udiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=i2 6o&wit
id=3684; Senate Hearing Testimony of Ronald Weich
(July 13, 2oo4), available at http://judiciary. sen-
ate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=i26o&wit-id=3 685; see also
Douglas Berman, "The 'Bowman Proposal': White
Knight or Force of Darkness?," available at http://
sentencing. typepad.com/sentencingdaw-and-policy/
2004/o7/white-knight_or.html, and other critiques
posted or referenced on Professor Berman's invaluable
blog, Sentencing Law & Policy, http://sentencing.
typepad.com.
TO: U.S. Sentencing Commission
FROM: Frank Bowman
RE: Blakely v. Washington
DATE: 6/27/04
This memorandum addresses the question of what,
if anything, the U.S. Sentencing Commission should do
in the wake of the decision in Blakely v. Washington. It
proceeds from two premises: First, that Blakely almost cer-
tainly applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, ren-
dering them either unconstitutional as now applied, or fa-
cially unconstitutional regardless of how applied. Second,
I assume that if Blakely does render the Guidelines un-
constitutional, the Commission will wish to do what it can
to bring the Guidelines into conformity with the Supreme
Court's decisional law, if possible. As I will explain below,
I believe that can be done in a way that will have very little
effect on the operation of the guidelines in practice, albeit
my suggestion would appear to require congressional
action.
I. The Effect of Blakely on the Guidelines
You will already have read Blakely and drawn your own
conclusions. It may be possible to draw technical dis-
tinctions between the Washington sentencing scheme
invalidated in Blakely and the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines; however, in the end such distinctions seem unlikely
to prove dispositive. In Washington, a defendant's con-
viction of the underlying statutory offense generated a
sentencing range within the outer bounds set by the
statutory minimum and maximum sentences. The judge
was obliged (or at least entitled) to adjust this range
upward, but not beyond the statutory maximum, upon
a post-conviction judicial finding of additional facts. In
its essentials, therefore, the Washington statute is in-
distinguishable from the federal sentencing guidelines.'
Thus, although the Court reserved ruling on the applica-
tion of its opinion to the Guidelines, there seems little
question that it does impact the Guidelines. Indeed, my
strong feeling is that Blakely is really about the federal
guidelines, in the sense that the Court would never have
assembled a five-member majority for the Blakely result
in the absence of the boiling frustration of the federal
judiciary over the state of the federal sentencing system
- a point that assumes some importance in the analysis
below.
The question then becomes what immediate effect
Blakely will have on the federal sentencing system. As
we have seen from press reports, federal sentencings all
over the country have stopped while courts and litigants
assess the situation. When judges begin to rule, they will
have three basic options: (a) find that Blakely does not
apply to the federal sentencing guidelines and proceed as
though nothing has happened; (b) find that the Sentencing
Guidelines survive, but that each guideline factor which
produces an increase in sentencing range above the base
offense level triggered by conviction of the underlying
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offense is now an "element" that must be pled and proven
to a jury or agreed to as part of the plea; or (c) find that
the Guidelines are facially unconstitutional, in which
case judges can sentence anywhere within the statutory
minimum and minimum sentences of the crime(s) of
conviction.
Consider these options and their practical conse-
quences:
(a) Blakely does not apply to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: For the reasons sketched above, I con-
sider this an unlikely result. In any event, even if some
judges adopt this approach, I strongly suspect that a
far greater number will adopt one of the other two.
(b) Blakely transforms the Guidelines into a part of the
federal criminal code: The second possibility is that
courts could find that the guidelines remain consti-
tutional as a set of sentencing rules, but that the
facts necessary to apply the rules must be found
beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or be agreed to
by the defendant as a condition of his or her plea. In
effect, all Guidelines rules whose application would
increase a defendant's sentencing range' would
become part of the substantive federal criminal code,
to be treated as "elements" of a crime for purposes
of indictment, trial, and plea.
As I will discuss in a moment, I think this view
of the Guidelines is constitutionally untenable, but
it also has a variety of what many will view as highly
undesirable practical consequences. These conse-
quences fall into two broad categories - effects on
trials and effects on plea bargaining.
First, if the Guidelines were henceforward to be
treated as elements of a crime, the government
would presumably have to include all guidelines
elements in the indictment, provide discovery
regarding those elements as required by the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
prove each guideline element to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. Among other effects, this
regime would presumably require that grand
juries find guidelines facts, and thus that they be
instructed on the meanings of an array of guidelines
terms of art - "loss," reasonable foreseeability,
sophisticated means, the differences between
"brandishing" and "otherwise using" a weapon,
etc. New trial procedures would have to be devised.
Either every trial would have to be bifurcated
into a guilt phase and subsequent sentencing phase,
or pre-Blakely elements and post-Blakely sentencing
elements would all be tried to the same jury at the
same time.3 If a unitary system of trial were adopted,
the judge would be required to address motions to
dismiss particular guidelines elements at the close
of the government's case and of all the evidence,4
before sending to the jury all guidelines elements
that survived the motions to dismiss. In either
a unitary or bifurcated system, the judge would
be obliged to instruct the jury on the cornucopia
of guidelines terms and concepts, and the jury
would have to produce detailed special verdicts. The
prospect of redesigning pleading rules, discovery
and motions practice, evidentiary presentations, jury
instructions, and jury deliberations to accommodate
the manifold complexities of the Guidelines should
give any practical lawyer pause. Leaving all other
considerations to one side, the potential for trial error
would skyrocket. One of the many perverse results
of such a nightmarishly complex system would
be the creation of a powerful new disincentive to
trials, and thus a probable diminution of the already
rare phenomenon of jury fact-finding that the
Blakely majority presumably meant to encourage.
Second, treating all Guidelines sentencing
enhancements as elements would markedly alter
the plea bargaining environment. This reading of
Blakely would transform every possible combination
of statutory elements and guidelines sentencing
elements into a separate "crime" for Sixth
Amendment purposes. This has two consequences
for plea bargaining: (a) As a procedural matter,
each Guidelines factor that generates an increase in
sentencing range would have to be stipulated to as
part of a plea agreement before a defendant could be
subject to the enhancement. (b) More importantly,
negotiation between the parties over sentencing facts
would no longer be "fact bargaining," but would
become charge bargaining. Because charge bargain-
ing is the historical province of the executive branch,
the government would legally free to negotiate every
sentencing-enhancing fact, effectively dictating
whatever sentence the government thought best
within the broad limits set by the interaction of the
evidence and the Guidelines. The government would
no longer have any obligation to inform the court of
all the relevant sentencing facts and the only power
the court would have over the negotiated outcome
would be the extraordinary (and extraordinarily
rarely used) remedy of rejecting the plea altogether. 5
A plea bargaining system that operated in
this way would be subject to a number of objections:
i. Some defense attorneys might prefer a system
in which fact bargaining was a legitimate
option. For some defendants, those with
particularly able counsel practicing in districts
with particularly malleable prosecutors,
the results might be more favorable than
are now obtainable under the stem discipline of
the current system. On the other hand, making
sentencing factor bargaining legitimate would
dramatically increase the leverage of prosecutors
over individual defendants and the sentencing
process as a whole, leading to worse results
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for some individual defendants and a general
systemic tilt in favor of prosecutorial power.
ii. In any case, any benefit to defendants
would inevitably be uneven, varying widely
from district to district and case to case. To the
extent that the Guidelines have made any gains
in reducing unjustifiable disparity, a system
in which all sentencing factors can be freely
negotiated would surely destroy those gains.
(Prevention of this outcome was, after all, the
point of the relevant conduct rules.) It might
be suggested that the Justice Department's
own internal policies regarding charging and
accepting pleas to only the most serious readily
provable offense would protect against disparity;
however, the experience of the last decade,
during which variants of the same policy have
always been in place, strongly suggests that local
U.S. Attorney's Offices cannot be meaningfully
restrained by Main Justice from adopting
locally convenient plea bargaining practices.
Once previously illegitimate "fact bargaining"
becomes legally permissible charge bargaining,
no amount of haranguing from Washington
will prevent progressively increasing
local divergence from national norms.
iii. Ironically, if Blakely were ultimately determined
to require (or at least permit) the Guidelines
to be transformed into a set of "elements" to
be proven to a jury or negotiated by the parties,
the effect would be to markedly reduce judicial
control over the entire federal sentencing
process. Not only would district court
judges be stripped of the power to determine
sentencing facts and apply the Guidelines
to their findings, but appellate courts would
be stripped of any power of review. Neither jury
findings of fact nor the terms of a negotiated
plea are subject to appellate review in any but
the rarest instances. Thus, the interpretation
of Blakely discussed here would have the
perverse effect of exacerbating one of the
central judicial complaints about the current
federal sentencing system - the increase of
prosecutorial control over sentencing out-
comes at the expense of the judiciary.
(c) Blakely renders the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
facially unconstitutional: The third possibility is that
Blakely will be read to render the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines facially unconstitutional, rather than
unconstitutional as now applied. Although
I have no doubt that some lower courts will adopt
the Guidelines-as-elements approach just discussed,
in my opinion the most likely final resolution of
the question by the Supreme Court is that the
Guidelines, as now written, cannot be squared
with Blakely and will be declared facially invalid.
My first reason for thinking so flows from the
preceding analysis of how a Guidelines-as-elements
system would have to work in practice. Not only would
such a system be remarkably ungainly, but far more
importantly, it would, as noted, exacerbate those
features of the current system that federal judges find
most galling. As I noted at the outset, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that Blakely is not really about
the Washington state system at all, but is, at bottom
a response to the federal judiciary's anger and angst
over recent trends in federal sentencing. Given
recent events, it is hard to imagine that the Supreme
Court and many lower courts would not strike down
the entire Guidelines system if given a plausible
constitutional argument for doing so. Particularly
if the only options facing the Court are preserving
a simulacrum of the Guidelines system that would
make the features judges find most objectionable
even worse, or striking the system down in its entirety
and starting anew, the choice almost makes itself.
Second, even if federal judges did not have
every reason to want to invalidate the Guidelines,
Blakely appears to me to require that result. Put
simply, the analysis is this: Blakely finds that it
is unconstitutional for a defendant's maximum
practically available sentence to be increased, post-
conviction, as a result of a judge making a mixed
determination of fact and law regarding the exi-
stence of a fact not determined by the jury and the
application of some set of sentencing rules to that
fact.6 The linchpin of the entire federal sentencing
guidelines system is precisely such post-conviction
judicial determinations of mixed questions of
law and fact. The Guidelines model has three basic
components: (i) post-conviction findings of fact
by district court judges; (2) application of Guidelines
rules to those findings by district court judges; and
(3) appellate review of the actions of the district court.
Both the Guidelines themselves and important
components of statutes enabling and governing
the Guidelines were written to effectuate this model.
Although it is intellectually possible to isolate the
Guidelines rules from the web of trial court decisions
and appellate review procedures within which the
rules were designed to operate, doing so does such
violence to the language, legislative history, and
fundamental conception of the Guidelines structure
that one could save them only by transforming
them by judicial fiat into something that neither
the Sentencing Commission nor Congress ever
contemplated that they would become.7 It is
certainly true that when construing statutes facing
constitutional objections that courts will attempt
to save so much of the statute as can be saved
consistent with the constitution. On the other
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hand, if the reading of a statute required to render
it constitutional transforms the statute into some-
thing entirely at odds with its original design and
conception, courts may properly strike down the
statute in its entirety.
Thus, while the Supreme Court could adopt a
saving interpretation of the Guidelines which
transformed them into elements of a new set of
guidelines crimes, the Court could, without any
violence to ordinary principles of constitutional
adjudication, just as easily find the whole structure
invalid. And most importantly, there is every reason
to believe that they will want to do precisely that.
II. So now what?
There are certainly some who would be delighted to
have the entire Guidelines structure be cast aside in the
hope that something preferable will arise in its place.
If one wants to destroy the whole structure more or
less regardless of what might fill the gap, the preferred
stance is one of inaction. On balance, however, both the
short and long term consequences of such a course seem
undesirable.
In the near term, the federal courts will be in chaos as
judges try to negotiate the labyrinth created by Blakely. In
the longer term, either the Guidelines will be transformed
into an annex to the criminal code, augmenting the power
of prosecutors and decreasing the authority of judges,
or more likely the whole structure will be thrown aside
and the process of creating a federal sentencing system
would have to begin anew. Such a process carries great
risks for all those interested in federal sentencing. For
the Commission, 17 years of work would be nullified.
For prosecutors, the basic idea of guidelines has been a
boon; acceding by inaction to the collapse of the current
structure with no guarantee of what might replace it
would present, at the least, a tremendous gamble. Even
those who have no investment in the Guidelines and
every interest in radical reform should be very concerned
that any replacement could be even more punitive and
more restrictive of judicial discretion than the Guidelines
themselves. Should the current political alignment in
Congress and the Executive persist beyond November,
precisely that outcome should reasonably be anticipated.
Assuming that one wants to preserve the fundamental
Guidelines structure or at least to avoid the risks presented
by letting Blakely play itself out, what can be done? I believe
that the Guidelines structure can be preserved essentially
unchanged with a simple modification - amend the
sentencing ranges on the Chapter 5 Sentencing Table to
increase the top of each guideline range to the statutory
maximum of the offense(s) ofconviction.
As written, Blakely necessarily affects only cases in
which post-conviction judicial findings of fact mandate or
authorize an increase in the maximum of the otherwise
applicable sentencing range. To the extent that Blakely
itself may be ambiguous on the point, the Supreme Court
expressly held in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79, 89-9o (1986), and reaffirmed in Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 24o6 (June 24, 2002), that
a post-conviction judicial finding of fact could raise the
minimum sentence, so long as that minimum was itself
within the legislatively authorized statutory maximum. It
bears emphasis that Harris was decided only two years
ago, and was decided after Apprendi and on the very same
day as Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (June 24, 2002),
the case whose reading of Apprendi Justice Scalia found
so important in his Blakely opinion. Thus, the change I
suggest would render the federal sentencing guidelines
entirely constitutional under Blakely and Harris.
The practical effect of such an amendment would be
to preserve current federal practice almost unchanged.
Guidelines factors would not be elements. They could
still constitutionally be determined by post-conviction
judicial findings of fact. No modifications of pleading
or trial practice would be required. The only theoretical
difference would be that judges could sentence defendants
above the top of the current guideline ranges without the
formality of an upward departure. However, given that
the current rate of upward departures is o.6%,8 and that
judges sentence the majority of all offenders at or below
the midpoint of existing sentencing ranges, the likelihood
that judges would use their newly granted discretion to
increase the sentences of very many defendants above
now-prevailing levels seems, at best, remote.
This proposal could not be effected without an amend-
ment of the SRA because it would fall afoul of the so-called
"25% rule," 28 U.S.C. §9 9 4 (b)(2), which mandates that
the top of any guideline range be no more than six months
or 25% greater than its bottom. The ranges produced by
this proposal would ordinarily violate that provision.
Accordingly, the following statutory language, or some-
thing like it, should serve:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, the sentencing ranges prescribed by Chapter
5 of the federal sentencing guidelines shall consist of
the minimum sentence now or hereafter prescribed by
law and a maximum sentence equal to the maximum
sentence authorized by the statute defining the offense
of conviction, or in cases in which a defendant has been
convicted of multiple counts, the sum of the maximum
sentences authorized by the statute or statutes defining
the offenses of conviction."
In addition, if such a statute were passed, the Com-
mission might think it proper to enact a policy statement
recommending that courts not impose sentences more
than 25% higher than the guideline minimum in the
absence of one or more of the factors now specified in the
Guidelines as potential grounds for upward departure.
Failure to adhere to this recommendation would not be
appealable, and thus such a provision would not fall foul of
Blakely. A few modifications to the Guidelines themselves
would also be required to bring them into conformity
with Blakely and the new statute - for example, it would
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have to be made clear that guideline provisions relating to
upward departures were now only factors recommended
to the district court for its consideration in determining
whether to sentence in the upper reaches of the new
ranges (or more than 25% above the bottom of the new
ranges if the foregoing suggested policy statement were
adopted). But otherwise, very little would have to change.
Although the core proposal made here is not one within
the power of the Sentencing Commission to enact on its
own, the endorsement of such a proposal by the Commis-
sion would carry considerable weight with congressional
decisionmakers.
III. A Concluding Thought
In the end, the proposal made here might only be a stopgap
which would serve to prevent chaos in the near term and
give everyone breathing space within which to plan the
next step in the evolution of the federal sentencing system.
It seems likely that the combination of general discontent
in the legal profession with the Guidelines and the very par-
ticular and focused displeasure of the Supreme Court may
in fairly short order compel some modifications of what we
now do. That is all to the good. Nonetheless, the inevitable
changes should come in a reasonably orderly way, rather
than in a panicked and disordered jumble. Ifa proposal like
the one made here were to be adopted, it would permit a
more consultative and deliberative process of reconsidera-
tion of current federal rules, a process that would nonethe-
less operate in the shadow of the looming possibility of
another, and this time definitive, judicial intervention.
Notes
There are, of course, many differences in the two systems,
but most of those differences would seem to be either
immaterial or to render the federal guidelines more, not less,
objectionable under the Blakely analysis. For example: (1)
Various observers have pointed out that the Washington
guidelines are statutory, while the Guidelines are the product
of a Sentencing Commission nominally located in the
Judicial Branch. However, the federal guidelines were
authorized by statute and amendments must be approved by
Congress (at least through the negative sanction of inaction).
More importantly, the institutional source of the rules seems
immaterial to the Court's Sixth Amendment concern about
the role of the jury in determining sentencing facts. (2) The
federal guidelines are far more detailed than their
Washington counterparts, but that seems only to make them
a greater offender against the Sixth Amendment principle
enunciated in Blakely. (3) The modified real-offense structure
of the Guidelines, in particular their reliance on uncharged,
or even acquitted, relevant conduct, is different than the
Washington system, but surely much more offensive to the
Blakely rule than the Washington scheme.
2 Possibly excluding rules on criminal history, since the Court
has previously held that sentence-enhancing facts relating to
criminal history need not be proven to a jury.
3 Alternatively, perhaps only those Guidelines elements
thought particularly prejudicial to fair determination of guilt
on the purely statutory elements would have to be
bifurcated, but that option would require a long, messy
process of deciding which Guidelines facts could be tried in
the "guilt" phase and which could be relegated to the
bifurcated sentencing phase.
Unlike other conventional "elements" of a crime, "guidelines
elements" would presumably be subject to dismissal at any
point in the proceedings without prejudice to the defendant's
ultimate conviction of the core statutory offense. For
example, in a unitary trial system, if the government failed to
prove drug quantity in its case-in-chief, the drug quantity
"element" could (and presumably should) be dismissed
pursuant to the F.R.Cr. P. at the close of the government's
case without causing dismissal of the entire prosecution. By
contrast, a failure to prove the "intent to distribute" element
of a 21 U.S.C. § 841 "possession with intent to distribute"
case would require dismissal of the entire prosecution.
And even this remedy would be of little practical use. If the
judge rejected a plea because she felt it was unduly punitive,
she could not prevent the government from presenting its
case to a jury. If a judge were to reject a plea on the ground
that it did not adequately reflect the full extent of the
defendant's culpability under Guidelines rules, the judge
could not force the government to "charge" the defendant
with additional Guidelines sentencing elements. The most
the court could do is force the case to trial on whatever
combination of statutory and guidelines elements the
government was willing to charge - a weak and
self-defeating remedy because the two possible outcomes of
a trial on such charges are a guilty verdict on the charges the
judge thought inadequate in the first instance or a not guilty
verdict on some or all of the charges, which would produce
even less punishment.
It is not only judicial fact-finding that offends the Sixth
Amendment under Blakely, though that alone is surely
enough. Recall that under the Washington sentencing
scheme, a judge who found the presence of a gun was not
legally obliged to sentence the defendant in the aggravated
range, but had to make the additional determination that the
fact found merited an increase. Justice Scalia found that
element of judicial choice present in the Washington statute
did not save it from constitutional oblivion. A post-conviction
judicial finding of fact that enabled the judge to exercise his
judgment to impose a higher sentence was, in Justice
Scalia's view, constitutionally impermissible. The fact that an
increased offense level is an automatic consequence of most
factual determinations under the federal guidelines certainly
seems to make them more objectionable, rather than less.
Time and space preclude a detailed exegesis of this point,
but consider as but two examples the relevant conduct rules
and the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act (both in its
original form and as amended by the recent PROTECT Act)
providing for appellate review. The relevant conduct rules
plainly contemplate sentences based on judicial
determinations of facts not found by jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Similarly, provisions of the Sentencing
Reform Act governing appellate review of guidelines
determinations are effectively nullified by a
guidelines-as-elements-of-the-offense application of Blakely
because if all upward guidelines adjustments must be
determined either by jury verdict or by stipulation, there is
virtually nothing left to review.
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